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S 14489 

: banks.' Such hanks are left free to voluntarily 
join the Federal Reserve System if they so 
desire, but they are hot compelled to com- 
ply with the System’s requirements as pro- 
vided in S. 1298. 

Thank you for your consideration of our 
request that the enclosed draft bill be In- 
troduced In the Senate. 

Sincerely yours, 

-{■ Charles R. McNeill, 

‘ •> Director, Washington Office. 


Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, for my- 
self and. my senior colleague from Okla- 
homa [Mr. Monroney], I introduce, for 
appropriate reference, a bill to provide 
for the conveyance of the so-called scat- 
tered tracts in Oklahoma, acquired un- 
der the act of June 26, 1936—49 Stat. 
1967. .. . 

The need for this legislation was 
brought to my attention by Mr. Charlie 
Elute, of Marble City, Okla., during a 
recent task force trip to four counties in 
eastern Oklahoma by various Federal of- 
ficials, Senator Mike Monroney, Rep- 
resentative Ed Edmondson, and me. 

The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 
June 26, 1936, authorized the Secretary 
of Interior to acquire interest liydands 
water rights, or surface rights k > lands 
then owned by Indians which w/re being 
used for agricultural and grazing pur- 
poses. It also provided that the lands 
should be held in trust by tVte United 
States, and during such time, thto should 
be tax free, except for a gross production 
tax to be collected by the State o\Okla- 

The bill I introduce today would\au- 
thorize the Secretary of Interior to give 
clear title of this land, including minera. 
deposits, to the life tenant or his heirs. 
It is left up’ to the Secretary of Interior 
to determine whether or not the deed 
shall provide that the land be free of 
restrictions and its tax-exempt status or 
subject to restrictions and its continued 
tax-exempt status. 

Mr. President, I am hopeful that ap- 
propriate action will be taken on this 
legislation at the earliest possible date. 
I ask unanimous consent that the bill 
be printed at this point in the Record, 
together with a letter I received from 
Mr. Eafl Boyd Pierce, addressed to Rep- 
resentative Ep Edmondson, who is gen- 
eral counsel of the Cherokee Nation, and 
other letters. 

will be received and appropriately re- 
ferred; and, without objection, the bill 
and letters will be printed in the Record. 

The bill '(S. 2520) to provide for the 
conveyance of so-called scattered tracts 
in Oklahoma, acquired under the act of 
June 26, 1926 (49 Stat. 1967) , introduced 
by Mr. Harris (for himseif and Mr. 
•Monroney")’, was received, read twice by 
Its title^ referred to the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, and ordered 
to be printed in the Record, as follows: 

'"*■ S. 2520 

Be it enacted ‘by the Senate and House 
of Representatives of the United States of 
.ytr^epea iri 'Congress assembled. That the 
wecretnry of the Interior Is authorized and 
"^recitgd to ‘convey to the life tenant, his 
heirs, devisees, successors, or assigns, title to 

the entire Interest In lands and Improve- 
ments thereon, including mineral deposits, 
that were acquired by the United States in 
trust for a designated Individual Indian for 
his lifetime and thereafter in trust for the 
Tribe, pursuant to the Oklahoma Indian 
Welfare Act of June 26, 1936 (49 Stat. 1967) : 
Provided, That the Secretary shall determine 
'in each Instance, that It Is In the best Inter- 
est of the Intended grantee to convey, and 
the deed shall so provide, such land either 
■(a) free of restrictions and Its tax-exempt 
status, or (b) subject to restrictions against 
alienation and Its continued tax-exempt 
status as provided under such Act of June 
26, 1936. 

The letters presented by Mr. Harris 
are as follows; 

Muskogee, Okla., April 3, 1967. 
Hon. Ed Edmondson, 

Member of Congress, 

Washington, D.C. 

Dear Ed: Immediately following the clos- 
ing of the Task Force Meeting in Tahlequah, 
Mr. Virgil Harrington suggested that I make 
an effort to solve the Charlie Flute land 

Mr. Flute a nd his Moth er Mrs. M ollie 
Flute, canja-^rme omce early this 
andjw«3fmaps, relevant Bureau letters and 
r documents completely clarified the 
title picture. Later Mrs. Merzl Schroeder, an 
extremely able attorney with the Bureau and 
Tahlequah Superintendent, Johnny Walker, 
■arrived with the “Flute File” giving more 
exact Information concerning the history of 
the title in question. Attached hereto Is a 
photostat copy of the Bureau letter dated 
March 14, 1956, addressed to Mr. Flute spell- 
ing out the essential facts, except that the 
land description constituted the original 
allotment of Charlie’s Grandmother, Esther 
Flute, Full' Blood Cherokee, Roll Number 
26718, now deceased. The Government paid 
the taxes on the land described In the Bu- 
reau letter on January 14, 1942, and by 
separate Deeds, in each case from the Grand- 
mother Esther, approved title was conveyed 
as shown In said letter to the individuals, all 
whom were Full. Blood Cherokees, fee title 
tiding placed in the United States In Trust 
for each Individual, during life time, then In 
Trust fw the Tribe, “until such time as the 
use of thKjand Is assigned by the Secretary” 
to either “asqpoperatlve group” or to an In- 
dividual Indialyand then “In Trust for such 
. group or IndlvlclblU”. Some of this language 
employed In the gristing clause was author- 
ized by the Act of Jtqie 26, 1936 (49 Stat.' 

In any event It is plalfslhat under the 
granting clause of the Grandmother, the Sec- 
retary was given authority at the instant of 
Mr. Flute’s death to bypass thb. < Cherokee 
Tribe, as a remainderman, and plane the 
beneficial use of the property dlrec^v and 
Immediately In either a cooperative group or 
in an individual Indian, at the discretion of 
the Secretary. 

Thus, Mrs. Schroeder and I have agreed 
that Congress alone has the authority 
dispose of lands where the title is held In 
the United States, and it Is believed tl)fet 
the attached proposed Bill, if enacted 
enable Mr. Flute and all other Chejdkees 
slmllarlly situated to receive, If tJjsrSecre 
tary so determines, a restrlctedjpe'fitle along 
with exemption from advjjlefcm taxes. Mr. 
Flute’s case, and l^jw^Eatlsfled that there 
sure a few othRm -Hfriie same situation, would 
cectalnly^Justlfy the consideration afforded 
to him by this proposed Bill. At least the 
discretion is left with the Secretary as to 
both items, and we are assured that with 
the passage of the Bill Mr. Flute will have 
no trouble obtaining adequate credit from 
either the Bureau or the Tribe, sufficient to 
satisfy his housing and other reasonable 
needs. Both Mrs. Schroeder and Mr. Walker 
share these views. 

We understand that there is a particular 
urgency about this matter and that it was 
Mr. Harrington’s wish that the Bill be sent 
Immediately to you with copies to our Sen- 
ators, provided Mrs. Schroeder was satisfied 
with the proposal. 

It is understood, of course, that the De- 
partments will be called upon for reports 
and If by chance any important legal points 
have been overlooked the same will be cor- 
rected by the experts In the Departments. 
We understood that the Task Force would 
he intolerant of any unusual delay in bring- 
ing to Mr. Charlie Flute positive and effec- 
tive relief. My personal expression of gratifi- 
cation for the timely appearance and good 
work of the Task Force will come later. 

Sincerely yours, 

Earl Boyd Pierce. 

General Counsel, 

Cherokee Nation. 

U.S. Department of the Interior, 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
Muskogee, Okla., March 14, 1956. 
Mr. Charlie Flute, 

Rt. 1, Bunch, Okla. 

Dear Charlie: On our last Field Day In 
Salllsaw, you requested that we send you 
[ascri ptions and plats of land deeded to 
tneT9*4ted States in Trust for Charlie, John- 
nie Macky Nancy, Bettle, Sarah, Thomas and 
Homer Flute. The land Is described below: 


Charlie Flute: Lot 2 and SW NE Of sec. 

1-13-23 80 

Johnnie Mack: Lots 3 and 4 and SE NW 

sec. 1-13-23 120 

Nancy Flute now Christie: Lot 1 and SE 

NE and N2 NE SE 1-13N-23 100 

Homer Flute: NW NE of sec. 12-13N- 

23 - - 40 

Homer Flute: W2 NW of sec. 11-13N- 

23 80 

Bettle Flute: S2 NE and EU'SE sec. 10- 

13N-23 .' 160 

Sarah Flute: NW of sec. 10-13N-23 160 

Thomas Flute: N2 SW and NE SE SW 

and NW SW SE, sec. 12-13-23 100 

Thomas Flute : NE NE SE and NW NE SE 
see. 11-13N-23E 1 20 

Total acres 860 

You also requested a description of the 
land of John Flute, Jr., Cherokee #25719. 
His land is described as: E2 SW and W2 SE 
of sec. 11-13N-23E, 160 acres. 

You asked whether or not the land, that 
had been deeded in Trust to you children 
oould be sold? In a lot of cases where land 
Is deeded to the United States in Trust for 
people can be sold by Issuing a (Patent in 
Fee.) Your Deeds do not come under this. 
They state: To the United States In Trust 
for “You Flutes” named above, during hls 
lifetime, then In Trust for the Cherokee Tribe 
of Oklahoma." This means, that all you have 
Is a Life estate In the land, described opposite 
your names, then the land reverts to the 
Cherokee Tribe at your death. 

We are enclosing 4 small plats of the above 
described land and 1 large plat showing all 
the land. 

If there Is anything further that we can 
do for you, please advise us. 

Sincerely yours, 

H. Nicholson, 

Field Representative. 



Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, on behalf 
of myself and Senators Brewster, Hart, 
Hatfield, Javits, McGee, McGovern, 
Mondale, Morse, Young of Ohio, and 
Percy, I submit a concurrent resolution 
dealing with the subject of United Na- 

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tions peacekeeping and peacemaking, and 
ask that it be appropriately referred. 

current resolution will be received and 
appropriately referred; and, under the 
rule, the concurrent resolution will be 
printed in the Record. 

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 
47) was referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, as follows: 

S. Con. Res. 47 

Whereas Congress has urged that there 
should be developed permanent organization 
and procedures to enable the United Nations 
promptly to employ suitable United Nations 
forces for such purposes as observation and 
patrol in situations that may threaten in- 
ternational peace and security (H. Con. Res. 
373, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second session) ; 

Whereas the need for such forces has been 
demonstrated by past experience and will be 
even greater in the future; and 

Whereas United Nations impartial peace- 
keeping forces will continue to be a major 
instrument for the maintenance of interna- 
tional peace and security : Therefore be it 

Resolved by the Senate ( the House of Rep- 
resentatives concurring) , That the Congress 
reaffirms its support for United Nations 
peacekeeping and peacemaking and urges: 

(a) That, as an immediate objective, the 
United States Government — 

(1) encourage and support the earmarking 
and specialized training of units by United 
Nations member states for employment in 
United Nations peacekeeping operations; 

(2) be prepared to make available to the 
United Nations transport, communications 

'and logistical personnel and facilities; and, 

(3) be prepared to advocate or support on 
all appropriate occasions proposals for guide- 
lines to govern the financing, training, equip- 
ping, and duration of peacekeeping forces for 
effective use, as well as guidelines to govern 
concomitant machinery for peacemaking 
where peacekeeping forces are in use. 

(b) That, as part of the long-range de- 
velopment of the United Nations as a more 
effective instrument for building and keep- 
ing peace, the United States Government en- 
courage and support the creation of a per- 
manent, individually recruited force under 
United Nations command for impartial peace- 
keeping duties. 

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the recent 
crisis in the Middle East focused atten- 
tion once again on the role of U.N. forces 
in preventing international conflict. De- 
bate on the rationale of the withdrawal 
of U.N.E.F. troops continues. But under- 
lying all debate is the recognition that 
first, a U.R. force is a vital component in 
the effort to develop effective machinery 
for peaceful settlement of disputes; and 
second, that there is a critical need to de- 
velop sound rules for the effective use 
of U.N. forces. 

Much has been said about the unwis- 
dom of the United States assuming the 
role of"‘policeman of the world.” I agree 
that the United States cannot and 
should not assume such a role. But what 
are the alternatives? Some say the 
United States should intervene unilat- 
erally wherever the peace is threatened; 
some say that a return to isolationism is 
the only answer. But neither extreme is 
appropriate in today’s world of rapid 
transportation and instant communica- 
tion, where the possibility of worldwide 
nuclear holocaust looms large whenever 
there is a disruption of the peace at any 
point on the globe. 

By taking initiatives within the United 
Nations, I believe the tJnited States can 
fulfill its responsibilities to the mainte- 
nance of world peace in a way properly 
fitting our role as the world’s most power- 
ful nation by providing specific recom- 
mendations for the creation of a perma- 
nent U.N. peace force with rules to guide 
its effective use and financing. 

Under the present system, as we have 
seen, U.N. forces are pulled together on 
an ad hoc basis in the heat of conflict 
with confused regulations as to their use, 
and their existence may be abruptly ter- 
minated just when they are most needed. 
Indeed, it is a wonder that they have 
been as successful as they have been. 
Certainly, the time has come to take a 
hard look at what can be done to assure 
the development of an effective arm of 
enforcement for the principles contained 
in article I of the United Nations Char- 

As a minimal step in this direction, I 
have submitted the Senate concurrent 
resolution which I have just sent to the 
desk. Its companion measure. House 
Concurrent Resolution 130 and 131, has 
already been introduced in the other 
body by 63 Representatives. 


Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unani- 
mous consent that, at the next printing 
of the bill (S. 2321) to supplement the 
antitrust laws of the United States in or- 
der to prevent anticompetitive practices, 
by providing for just compensation upon 
termination of certain franchise rela- 
tionships, the name of the Senator from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Nelson] be added as a 

objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- 
ident, on behalf of the Senator from New 
York [Mr. Kennedy], I ask unanimous 
consent that, at its next printing, the 
names of the Senator from Idaho [Mr. 
Church] and the Senator from Oregon 
[Mr. Hatfield] be added to the bill (S. 
2394) to amend the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act with re- 
spect to the labeling of packages of 
cigarettes, and for other purposes. 

objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi- 
dent on behalf of the Senator from New 
York [Mr. Kennedy], I ask unanimous 
consent that, at its next printing, the 
name of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. 
Hatfield] be added as a cosponsor of the 
bill (S. 2395) to direct the Federal Com- 
munications Commission to establish 
regulations prohibiting certain broad- 
casting of advertising of cigarettes. 

objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi- 
dent, on behalf of the Senator from New 
York [Mr. Kennedy], I ask unanimous 
consent that the name of the Senator 
from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] be added 
as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 2396) to 
amend the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 to tax cigarettes on the basis of 
their tar and nicotine content. 

objection, it is so ordered. 


Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as chair- 
man of the Subcommittee on the Depart- 
ment of Transportation, of the Commit- 
tee on Appropriations, I ask unanimous 
consent that the following named Sena- 
tors be added as conferees on the part of 
the Senate to the conference to be held 
on the bill (H.R. 11456) making appro- 
priations for the Department of Trans- 
portation for the fiscal year ending June 
30, 1968, and for other purposes: The 
Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pas- 
tore] the Senator from Oklahoma 
[Mr. Monroney], and the Senator from 
Maine [Mrs. Smith]. 

objection, it is so ordered. 


On request, and by unanimous con- 
sent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., 
were ordered to be printed in the Ap- 
pendix, as follows : 


Article entitled “Military-Industrial Com- 
plex,” written by Joseph C. Harsch, and pub- 
lished in the Christian Science Monitor of 
October 4, 1967. 

Article entitled “A General in Arms,” an 
interview of Gen. James M. Gavin by Emmet 
John Hughes, published in Newsweek maga- 
zine for October 16, 1967. 




Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it 
was with interest that I read an article 
in the September 1 issue of Fortune 
magazine, by an old friend and a very 
excellent reporter, Mr. Dan Cordtz. The 
article is entitled “But What Do We Do 
About the Arabs?” 

I believe it would be worthwhile for 
the Senate to give the article due con- 
sideration, because of the difficulties 
which exist, which have existed, and 
which may well exist in the Middle East 
for some time to come, so that collec- 
tively as well as individually we may 
achieve a better understanding of the 

I ask unanimous consent that this per- 
tinent piece of information be printed 
at this point in the Record. 

There being no objection, the article 
was ordered to be printed in the Record, 
as follows: 

But What Do We Do About the Arabs? 

(By Dan Cordtz) 

(Note. — The strategic importance of the 
Middle East to the world’s industrial nations 
often gets overlooked in close-in debate over 
the Israeli-Arab war. In the first three 
articles of this issue Fortune assesses the 
high stakes involved in terms of people, 
geography, and — by no means least — oil.) 

Two decades ago, In the eyes of nearly all 
Arabs, the U.S. towered over every other 
major power. Today America is a curse on the 
lips of many of the moBt Intelligent and 
moderate in their ranks. "At this moment,” 

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October 10, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 14491 

claims an embittered Princeton-educated 
former Jordanian minister, “there is no Arab 
more extreme than the other. What I say 
about the U.S. is being said by every Kuwaiti, 
Saudi, or Libyan. Lite Churchill, we are 
ready to make an alliance with the devil to 
keep ourselves alive.” An American historian 
declares flatly that “not since the Boxer Re- 
bellion has there been as rapid and ubiqui- 
tous a revulsion against a foreign power as 
there has been against the U.S. in the Middle 
East.” And a man who once helped formu- 
late our Arab policy sadly acknowledges that 
“our ability to play a role in that region has 
never been less than it is today.” 

This gloomy assessment is shared by many 
well-informed people in the U.S. — in gov- 
ernment and outside. Some knowledgable 
specialists in the State Department are very 
concerned about the precipitous decline in 
our Influence. So are the most respected 
academic experts on the Middle East and, 
when they are willing to discuss it, American 
businessmen with interests and long experi- 
ence in the Arab lands. Their fears, together 
with the outrage and despair of Arabs who 
were once among America’s closest friends, 
suggest the time has come for a realistic, 
full-scale reappraisal of our objectives in the 
Arab world, their priorities, and the means 
by which they can best be attained. 

The stakes are great, and go far beyond 
our obvious interest in the safety of Israel. 
In a world of intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles, the Middle East has lost some of its 
historic value as a strategic geographic area. 
Some, but npt all. For the region is still the 
fastest, cheapest transportation route — by 
air or sea — between Western Europe and 
Asia. And still more important, beneath its 
desert sands, lie close to 300 billion barrels 
of petroleum, about three-fourths of the 
non-Communist world’s proved reserves. 

. Daily production of the Arab wells total more 
than nine million barrels.. According to oil 
consultant Walter Levy, the complete loss 
of this oil could not be made up by any com- 
bination of other sources within a decade — 
if at all. Western Europe imports 5,600,000 
barrels of Arab oil each day, 65 percent of its 
requirements, and Japan 1,200,000 (60 per- 
cent) . If the Russians should achieve dom- 
ination of the Arab countries, as many 
Arabs now fear they will, they could black- 
mail both Western Europe and Japan by 
threatening to turn off the taps and cripple 
their economies. The ultimate price for as- 
sured oil supplies, some American diplomats 
grimly speculate, could well be a sharp 
diminution of U.S. influence in Europe and 

The major goal of most of our efforts iri the 
Middle East is to keep that from happening. 
There are serious doubts,, today that we are 
succeeding. The Communist camel poked his 
nose under the tent In 1355 when Egyptian 
President Nasser, rebuffed by the U.S., 
turned to Czechoslovakia for weapons. In 
the years since, the beast has steadily made 
nejv encroachments. None of the Arab coun- 
tries can yet be labeled Red satellites, but 
the Russian gains have been impressive and 
worrisome. In Syria, where a series of coups 
d’etat has wiped out layer on' layer of edu- 
cated leaders and many of those who remain 
are leftist, the army is Russian equipped and 
largely directed by Soviet advisers. Egypt, its 
economy almost bankrupt and its expensive 
military machine shattered, is more depend- 
ent than ever on Russian assistance. Two 
years after the elimination of Premier Ben 
Bella, Algeria still truculently proclaims its 
close friendship with Russia. And these are 
three of the weightiest Arab nations. 

Underlying elements' of strength remain 
to us: only recently escaped from colonial 
rule, the Arabs are not anxious to hand over 
their independence: even Nasser has kept 
local Comniunlsts under control and has 
moved quietly to restore communication 
with the U.S. And "Communism, as an Ideol- 

ogy, is incompatible with the Arabs' dom- 
inant Islamic faith. That said, though, re- 
emergence of the dormant Arab-Israeli con- 
flict has so polarized Middle Eastern politics 
that there is danger that nearly all the Arab 
countries will ally themselves with the Soviet 
Union in opposition to iBrael and its pro- 
tector, the U.S. Anti-Communist Arabs fran- 
tically warn that this is already happening. 
According to a Lebanese statesman whose 
pro-Western credentials are beyond re- 
proach, "The U.S. must ask itself this cen- 
tral question : ‘Are we ready to hand over the 
Middle East to the Russians?’ ” 

Measured against the U.S. Government’s 
own formally enunciated goals, our present 
approach can hardly be termed a rousing 
success. We have failed to keep the Russians 
out or under control. We were unable to pre- 
vent an outbreak of hostilities. The Suez 
Canal is closed once more. Continued access 
to the oil, on acceptable terms, remains in 
doubt. It can even be argued that Israel’s 
long-term security and prosperity, far from 
being enhanced, are today in greater 

Some of these aims, it must be conceded, 
are so ambitious as to be almost unrealistic; 
perhaps no policy devised by human in- 
genuity can ever attain them all. Washing- 
ton officials warn that “the first thing to re- 
member is that we aren’t God.” One ob- 
serves: “We found out in this latest Middle 
Eastern crisis that even we and the Soviets 
together couldn’t give orders and expect peo- 
ple to snap their heels and come to atten- 
tion.” There is much to this. The Arab world 
is not a “world” but a sprawling, diffuse col- 
lection of thirteen states with little in com- 
mon but language. Our goals there are some- 
times contradictory, as we seek to remain 
friendly with states antagonistic to one an- 
other. Our tools are limited: our military 
strength is unusable, our aid programs are 
hedged with restrictions demanded by Con- 
gress, and persuasion is often ineffective. In 
a sense, moreover, our efforts are subject to 
a double veto: Israel and its supporters can 
establish one boundary to our policy, and 
the oil-producing Arab states another. 


The U.S. is actually confronted with two 
different though related sets of problems. 
The first, ever present in the background and 
at times totally overshadowing the other, - 
arises out of our very special friendship with 
Israel. Virtually all the Arab countries’ 
leaders came to power after Israel’s establish- 
ment, and therefore began relations with the 
U.S. tacitly accepting our close ties with the 
Jewish state we had helped create. While the 
Middle East is quiet those ties can usually be 
ignored in the interests of cooperation. But 
when periodically the two sides clash, as 
they did over passage through the Gulf of 
Aqaba, U.S. support of Israel produces a 
poisonous Arab reaction. i 

The second group of complications have 
their origin in the frequently waspish rela- 
tions among the Arab nations themselves. 
For a number of years this has really meant 
relations of each of^the other nations with 
Nasser. Other regimes must come to grips 
with the Egyptian leader because he is, 
however much they may deplore it, the most 
popular political leader in the Arab world 
and the only Arab to whom both the big 
powers pay much attention. And he has 
evinced ambitions about his and Egypt’s 
role in the Arab world that almost inevitably 
pose threats to leaders of the oil-producing 
lands, where are greatest material interests 

Nasser appears to be aiming for eventual 
unification of the Arab world under his 
domination. Part of his motivation is prob- 
ably personal ambition. But he also seems 
to persuade millions that the welfare of 
Egypt and even the other Arabs will thereby 
be served. Wealth and population are un- 

evenly distributed in the Middle East; KU 
wait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya have lots of 
oil and few people, while Egypt is poor and 
crowded. Thus a combination, Nasser be- 
lieves, would benefit everyone. And the re- 
gion’s political power, he reasons, would be 
enhanced if it spoke on the world stage with 
one voice. In his efforts, though, Nasser 
has run afoul of the nationalist aspirations of 
other Arab rulers, who are unwilling to sub- 
mit to his leadership. While his appeal to the 
masses is great and extends to literally all of 
the Arab lands, he is regarded as a threat 
by many of their leaders — especially King 
Hussein of Jordan, King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, and Presi- 
dent Bourguiba of Tunisia. 

In his drive to unify and lead the Arabs, 
Nasser has tried a number of different tactics. 
He Joined with Syria and, later in 1958, Ye- 
men, to form the United Arab Republic, then 
sadly watched its dissolution three years 
later after a Syrian Army revolt. He has been 
accused by other Arab chieftains of plotting 
to overthrow or assassinate them. He has 
employed Radio Cairo to pour out a steady 
stream of vilification on those who opposed 
him. He intervened in Yemen’s civil war to 
gain a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and 
to ensure a friendly regime in Aden when 
the British depart. More recently, of course, 
he used the tension of the confrontation 
with Israel to force Hussein into a military 
pact. None of these stratagems has really 
been successful. From time to time, disap- 
pointed and chastened, Nasser retires behind 
his own borders vowing to concentrate on 
Egypt’s internal economic problems. But an 
American acquaintance suggests that those 
problems are so staggering that Nasser can 
bear to look at them for only six months 
or so and then begins longing again for his 
old foreign adventures. 

The official U.S. attlutde toward Nasser has 
swung wildly from ardent cultivation to 
near-ostracism. A former government ofllclal 
who knows the Egyptian president well con- 
tends that we have always handled him ex- 
actly wrong — wooing him when we should 
have been firm and hitting him too hard 
when the wooing didn’t work. Thus in the 
early days of the Kennedy Administration, he 
suggests, we were overgenerous in granting 
aid to Egypt, then too precipitate in with- 
drawing it four years later when Nasser dis- 
pleased us. Egyptian resentment was height- 
ened by the fact that in the year before 
withdrawal 98 percent of the aid was food, 
which made it appear that we were condemn- 
ing Egypt’s poor > starvation out of spite. 

There are those who believe, however, that 
we had lost any hope of getting along with 
Nasser long before that. They label the Is- 
raeli raid on the Gaza Strip in February, 1955, 
the beginning of the end. Nasser was ap- 
palled to discover, when the Israeli troops 
poured into Gaza, that they could Just as 
easily have swept on to Cairo. He demanded 
that the U.S. sell him arms to counterbal- 
ance the Israeli strength. After months of 
unsuccessful haggling, he announced a deal 
with the Czechs for weapons in amounts and 
varieties far greater than anything he had 
asked from the U.S. In July, 1956, President 
Eisenhower, Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, retaliated by backing down on com- 
mitments to help build the high dam at 
Aswan. A week later Nasser seized the Suez 
Canal, and three months after that Israel, 
Britain, and France invaded Egypt. Ulti- 
mately, of course, the U.S. played a major 
role in forcing the invaders out. But Dulles’ 
legalistic rationalizations fanned little 
warmth in Egyptian breasts; some Egyptians 
blame us for bringing about the crisis in the 
first place. 

In our dealings with other Arab countries, 
we have always been Influenced by the 
thought of Nasser in the background. Thus 
we have quickly cooled to Arabs who seemed 
to share Nasser’s radical aims: Syria, the 

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Yemeni Republicans, sometimes Iraq. And we 
have been solicitous of those who appeared 
potential counterweights to Nasser. The most 
striking example, of course, is Jordan, where 
we have poured millions into an effort to 
create a viable economy in a state almost 
without resources. The weakness in this bal- 
ancing policy has always been the Israeli 
question. When the Middle East is evenly di- 
vided between the revolutionaries and the 
conservatives, our material interests are rea- 
sonably protected. But where Israel is con- 
cerned, no Arab leader is secure enough to 
stand by us while we maintain a posture of 
favoritism. It seems fair to ask if we might 
improve our prospects in the Arab world, and 
indirectly further Israel’s best long-term in- 
terests, by a more visibly evenhanded ap- 


Evenhandedness, of course. Is not always 
easy to attain. At times it is impossible. 
When Nasser announced the blockade of the 
Gulf of Aqaba, there was no middle ground. 
The U.S. had to accept it or oppose it; we 
opposed it. Similarly, when an intransigent 
Arab leader puts us in a position that chal- 
lenges our commitment to Israel’s existence, 
we have no room for maneuver. But there 
have been many examples of less inevitable 
partiality in the past that had already condi- 
tioned the Arabs to regard us as completely 
in the Israeli camp when trouble came. Offi- 
cial government aid to Israel ($1.1 billion), 
for example, almost equals that given Egypt 
over the, past two decades — although Egypt 
has eleven times as many people. In that 
same period another $1 billion in private aid, 
by means of tax-deductible contributions 
to the United Jewish Appeal, has tipped the 
balance even more. And while the U.S. Gov r 
emment seldom hesitates to threaten the 
cutoff of aid when Arab regimes displease us, 
only at the time of the Suez Invasion of 1956 
did we use that stick on Israel. Much as we 
deplored the Israeli attack in June, we did 
not employ all the pressure available to us to 
head it off. (liter the cease-fire, moreover, the 
U.S. posture in the United Nations was 
plainly on. .the side of Israel. However compel- 
ling our reasons, we abandoned an uncon- 
ditional seventeen-year-old commitment — 
reaffirmed as recently as May 23 by President 
JTohnson — to the territorial, integrity of all 
the states in the Middle East. We also ab- 
stained on the Pakistani resolution deploring 
Israel’s take-over of Jerusalem, although we 
had publicly criticized such action. Not sur- 
prisingly, even the more moderate Arabs 
were outraged. 

Some studies of what can be done to re- 
store our badly damaged position are under 
way in the government, but there is reason 
to doubt that they are as searching and crit- 
ical as the situation may require. Early in 
the crisis. President Johnson appointed a 
special task force run by former White House 
aide McGeorge Bundy, giving the impression 
that Washington was taking a hard new 
look at our policies. But Bundy has now 
gone back to his duties at the Ford Founda- 
tion and is spending only part time on the 
Washington project. Officials are at pains, 
moreover, to deny that any criticism of the 
past was implied by the task force’s appoint- 
ment. It was designed merely to help coordi- 
nate operations related to Middle Eastern 
problems, they expain. 


The fact is that Washington policy makers, 
while they insist they are not complacent, 
seem remarkably unalaxmed. Consoled by 
what they call disastrous Soviet losses, they 
discount the view of moderate Arabs that 
our own losses have been even more severe. 
They appear to regard Arab emotions as not 
truly a factor in the equation, or at least 
as too unreliable to consider in planning 
future action. Some speak confidently, and 
even condescendingly, of how fickle those 

emotions are. (“Opinion is a very flexible 
thing in the Arab world," a responsible 
official remarks. “An Egyptian journalist once 
told me that it takes three days to change 
public opinion in Egypt.") They count 
heavily on the traditional divisions of the 
Arab world and fear of Communism to send 
some of its leaders scurrying back to us for 
aid and protection. 

They also recognize the formidable built-in 
political resistance to any consideration of 
new directions in American Middle Eastern 
policies. The overwhelming majority of U.S. 
citizens neither know nor care anything 
about the "region. Most of those who do care 
are emotionally partial to Israel, and many 
of these are effectively vocal in their support. 
Few of the remainder can or will make them- 
selves heard. Either they are dissuaded by 
fears of being labeled anti-Semitic, or their 
small voices are lost in the void of public 

This near-unanimous backing for Israel 
handicaps U.S. diplomats in .the Arab world. 
In the recent fighting, certainly, Israel bene- 
fited from the fact that the Syrians and 
Egyptians had provoked the crisis and had 
made noisy threats about their intentions. 
But the American public’s sympathy for 
Israel has been obvious throughout the little 
country's history. “There’s nothing we can 
do about that partiality,” says a former U.S. 
ambassador to a major Arab capital. “It’s 
the great embarrassment of the official policy 
in the Middle East.” 

The one-sided attitude of the American 
public, moreover, reflects more than their 
sympathetic feelings about the Israelis. 
Americans react negatively to their image of 
the Arabs as backward, cruel, largely un- 
civilized desert dwellers— an image, accord- 
ing to one Arab scholar, derived from dimly 
recalled, badly taught Sunday-school stories 
and unconscious religious hostility toward 
Islam. There is no real knowledge to counter 
the myths. Certainly there is little awareness 
of the Arabs’ illustrious history, a fact that 
infuriates them. And far too often the Arabs, 
as some of them admit, have been their own 
worst enemies. Many of their leaders have 
offended U.S. voters and their representatives. 
Extravagant language is much admired in the 
Arab world, for example, but Americans tend 
to take it at face value. 

On the other hand, we have made no effort 
- whatever to look at the problems of the Mid- 
dle East through Arab eyes. To do so is to 
begin to discern the dimensions of their 
grievances. There are many — not ail of them 
entirely realistic. Many Arabs believe we 
want the militarily weak and divided, which 
may well be true so long as Nasser remains 
the obvious candidate to lead a united Arab 
world. They suspect we want to retain, 
through our aid programs and other means, 
much of the influence of the old colonial 
powers. They charge that we have brought 
them into the cold war by forcing Egypt to 
turn to the Communists for weapons and by 
labeling neutrality immoral. They complain 
that our assistance to them is niggardly and 
motivated not by friendship but by self- 
interest. These grievances have long existed, 
but they have been given special force by 
dramatization of the more serious Arab 
charge that we are blatantly partial where 
Israel is concerned. So strongly do they feel 
about this that many who reject Nasser’s 
charges of direct U.S. involvement in the 
war regard our financial and diplomatic sup- 
port of Israel as almost equally reprehensible. 


Only the complaint about Israel is univer- 
sal. But it has inflamed even basically pro- 
Westerri’ Arabs so much that many are now 
Inclined to endorse the other accusations 
as well. And the compulsion to strike back 
Jeopardizes, to a greater degree than ever 
before, our stake in the Arab countries’ oil. 
There is considerable reluctance, on the part 
of American oilmen no less than government 

officials, to make much of this stake in public. 
They realize that it is all but impossible, 

In a nation with the popular traditions of the 
U.S. to suggest that material interests should 
be weighed along with such human consid- 
erations as Israel’s welfare. It is senseless, 
however, not to face up to the very real 
possibility of the loss of the oil and the im- 
plications of such a loss. 

In ten years, development of alternative 
sources of energy could reduce Arab oil’s im- 
portance drastically. But for now it is quite I 
literally irreplaceable. Even the present par- 
tial boycott has created serious hardships for 
Britain. The added transportation costs and 
higher prices for substitute oil amount to 
roughly $1 million a day. The U.S., whose Arab 
petroleum imports amounted to only 350,000 
barrels a day, hag not suffered, but individual 
American companies have been hurt (see 
page 86). As a group, U.S. oil firms have a 
gross Investment of nearly $3 billion ($1.5 
billion net after depreciation) in the Arab 
lands, and their profits from production there 
last year amounted to more than $1 billion. 

It is by no means clear what the oil com- 
panies’ fate will be. The largest Arab oil- 
producing states, thus far, have not shown 
great enthusiasm for the total shutdown ad- 
vocated by some Arab countries. The meas- 
ures they have taken, in fact, were the least 
they could do as members of the Arab 
world. But oilmen still have their fingers 
crossed. An unhappy executive In Beirut 
says, “It would be difficult for me to lay a 
bet on our being here five years from now, 
and if we are the situation won’t be easy.” 

Yet immediate nationalization of the fields 
and expulsion of the foreign operating com- 
panies is unlikely. The idea has long ap- 
pealed to many Arab leaders, including some 
whom the U.S. Government regards as 
friends. Even splitting the proceeds about 
sixty-forty with the companies, and selling 
at the lowest prices In the world ($1.59 per 
barrel for Kuwaiti oil compared with $2.27 
for Venezuelan crude), the oil-producing 
countries take in an estimated $2.5 billion a 
year in royalties and taxes from the oil firms. 

If they could keep all the selling price, and 
could agree among themselves to raise that 
price, the wealth generated — for economic 
development or weapons — would be stagger- 
ing. Nationalization, however, would be far 
from easy to carry out. Arab experts agree 
that all the countries would' have to take 
the step together and this just doesn't seem 
to be in the cards under the present cir- 

Even if the countries could coordinate na- 
tionalization, they would face the formid- 
able problem of selling their oil. The market- 
ing outlets in the major oil-consuming re- 
gions are in private hands. Unless the evicted 
companies agreed to buy the oil, foregoing 
their share of the most profitable phase of 
the business, the Arabs would have almost 
no place to turn. “It would be very difficult 
to replace the financial resources of the 
Western world," admits an Arab petroleum 

If nationalization is only a remote threat, 
however, some form of painful squeeze on 
the companies is probable. A continuation 
of the crisis, in fact, seems likely to bring 
unwelcome changes in the structure of the 
industry. The French are vigorously seeking 
to convert President de Gaulle’s stance into 
material advantage by improving their po- 
sition In the Arab oil fields. And the Italian 
Government oil agency, E.N.I., which has 
long coveted access to Arab oil, now seems 
within sight of its goal. Talks between E.N.I. 
and the Iraqi Government have been going 
on since 1961, when Iraq announced the ex- 
propriation of about 99 percent of the West- 
ern consortium’s acreage. Now the Italian 
Government reportedly is dangling a $70- 
million low-interest loan in exchange for a 
development contract for E.N.I. American 
oilmen are resigned to seeing both the 

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French and the Italians achieve some meas- 
ure of success. 

It appears certain that the companies will 
have to settle for a' smaller share of the oil 
revenues. Three weeks after the cease-fire, 
Beirut’s authoritative Middle East Economic 
Survey noted that “Arab oil producing coun- 
tries, to fulfill their role as financiers of the 
Arab world, will have to insure a steady in- 
crease in their oil revenues, not only in terms 
of over-all payments but also in terms of per- 
barrel payments.” Even if the situation quiets 
down, therefore, the outlook is for slimmer 
profits and more painful headaches in 'the 
oil business. And if large-scale fighting 
Should break out once more, with the U.S. 
sympathetic to the Israelis, expulsion of 
American firms would be a real possibility, no 
matter how seif-destructive that might be. 


In spite of its Importance, if our interest in 
the oil conflicted directly with our concern 
for Israel, we would probably regretfully have 
to watch the oil go down the drain. But our 
stake in both may well call for some shift in 
our position. A good case can be made that 
Israel, for reasons easy to understand, has 
been pursuing a course that is not in its own 
best long-term interests. It could further be 
argued that the U.S. has encouraged these 
unwise policies by failure to view the Middle 
East from a more dispassionate and balanced 
position. Thus the U.S. alienated the Arabs 
and was unable to dissuade Israel from action 
that may have made its existence all the 
more precarious. The shock waves from 
Israel’s victory are still sweeping across the 
Middle East. Ironically, U.S. officials say, they 
threaten most damage in the very lands that 
had been most tolerant toward Israel. The 
tiny Jewish state’s long-range security, more- 
over, may not truly be enhanced by boundary 
changes or declarations of an end to belliger- 
ency or even free passage through the Gulf 
of Aqaba. Ultimately, Israel can prosper only 
If its Arab neighbors can be reconciled to its 

In the long sweep of history the Arabs have 
a lot going for them. The Western world 
tends to view Israel even now as the under- 
dog — a tiny Jewish David facing the Arab 
Goliath. This is true in terms of total popu- 
lations (2,500,000 Israelis versus 110 million 
Arabs) and geographic area, but today the 
Israelis are almost a match for the Arabs in 
terms of citizens able to play a constructive 
role in modern society— -those in good health, 
educated, skilled, and possessed of high 
morale. The Arabs are not likely to remain 
forever industrially backward, unable to em- 
ploy the tools of destruction effectively. In 
spite of many mistakes and setbacks, a re- 
markable amount of progress has already 
been made in education in the past decade. 
By 1990, moreover, the Arabs are expected to 
number more than 200 million to Israel’s six 
million, at present rates of growth. If the ten- 
sions cannot be eased somehow, Israel one 
day will face overwhelming force. Even pro- 
tected by nuclear weapons or foreign allies, 
it will then only be able to emulate Samson 
and destroy its enemies along with itself. 

In spite of this prospect, there has been 
almost no progress toward defusing the ex- 
plosive animosity. Israeli policy seems di- 
rected above all else at forcing the Arabs 
formally to admit defeat and, by implication, 
to accept as settled many Issues still out- 
standing. But viewed in long-range terms, 
this reverses the logical order of events. First, 
the issues that divide the antagonists should 
be resolved; then a formal end to hostilities 
could follow almost as a matter , of course. 
>Arab leaders now find it impossible to ac- 
knowledge Israel under duress. And even if 
they can be forced to do so, their signatures 
on a peace treaty will neveT prevent further 
warfare while the basic causes of Arab hos- 
tility remain. After almost two decades of 
no progress toward reconciliation, Israelis 
and their American well-wishers should ex- 

amine soberly the possibility that a change 
of strategy could bring better results, 


It is obviously far easier to criticize past 
policies than to formulate new ones. There 
are no dramatic new initiatives to propose, 
and no one can say with assurance that this 
or that program will work. But what might 
offer some hope is a new approach, one that 
focuses not on securing controversial and 
possibly unessential Israeli “rights” but on 
helping the Arabs regain their self-respect. 
Over the long run, this can be done only by 
the Arab countries themselves, by means of 
development that enables them to view 
themselves as the economic and political 
equals of Israel. For the shorter term, how- 
ever, there are at least two offenses to Arab 
pride that could be eliminated : the unhealed 
sore of the refugees from the 1948 violence 
and the presence on Arab soil of conquering 
Israeli soldiers. By persuading the Israelis to 
take a generous attitude on these two issues, 
moreover, the U.S. could demonstrate its 
impartiality in a way that would strengthen 
the hand of its own embarrassed Arab 
friends — e.g., Hussein of Jordan, Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia, ef al. 

The form and dimensions of the refugee 
problem may have been altered substantially 
by the outcome of the fighting. The Israeli 
forces overran, and now occupy, territory 
where about half of the refugees lived before 
the war started. It is Impossible to predict 
how many will end up In Israeli-occupied 
territory. An undetermined number fled to 
areas still in Arab hands and, although Israel 
has agreed to permit some of them to return, 
it is still unclear how liberal the Israeli Gov- 
ernment will be about their repatriation. But 
it is certain that Israel has under its Juris- 
diction a large share of the refugees. 

There has been speculation that Israel 
will now move to Integrate them into the 
economic life of the captured lands. In this 
there may be some wishful thinking. For 
the west-bank region of Jordan, although 
already developed to a considerable degree, 
was crowded before Its occupation. It may be 
impossible to absorb all of the refugees there, 
and thus far Tel Aviv has shown no willing- 
ness to take them back into pre-war Israel. 
Signs of Arab resistance to Israeli rule in 
Old Jerusalem, moreover, cast doubt on 
the assumption that many Arabs will live 
willingly under the government of Israel. It 
is conceivable that events may prove to have 
diminished the refugee problem. On the 
other hand, it may turn out that the situa- 
tion has only been complicated further. 
Certainly the way in which the Israeli-con- 
trolled refugees are treated could play a 
part in determining the future attitude of 
reasonable Arabs. And the U.S., by insist- 
ing on fair and considerate treatment, could 
help regain its position among these Arabs. 


But there still remains the “old” refugee 
issue, which has been nagging the conscience 
of the world since 700,000 refugees fled Pal- 
estine when Israel was established. In nine- 
teen years their numbers have swollen to’ 
1,300,000 and they lived, before the latest 
fighting broke out, in Lebanon, Syria, Jor- 
don, and the Gaza Strip. Some exist in the 
worst squalor; the luckiest occupy monoto- 
nous, crowded, but relatively livable camps 
operated by the United Nations Belief and 
Works Agency. Even they are housed, clothed, 
fed, and inadequately educated on a daily 
allowance of 10 cents per person. 

The U.S. .contributes, the lion’s share to- 
ward their subsistence; It has given $403 
million of the $599 million donated to refu- 
gee care through last year. Private citizens 
recently formed a Near East Emergency Do- 
nations Committee (NEED) to channel ad- 
ditional corporate and individual donations 
to the agency in the current emergency. 
Periodically, UB. officials have attempted to 

promote a settlement. Invariably, rebuffs 
from one side or the other have made us 
throw up our hands. Israel has attempted to 
use the refugees as bargaining counters in 
its campaign to force Arab recognition. The 
Arabs have seen them as their strongest claim 
on the decency of the West — their only good 
card in the propaganda game. 

Israel has much to gain from elimination 
of the problem. Besides being pitiable, the 
refugees are extremely dangerous. From their 
ranks have come most of the commando- 
type raiders who periodically cross Into 
Israel and stage terrorist attacks. It is their 
presence, as an organized, easily manipu- 
lated pressure group, that has kept Arabs of 
good will at the mercy of lowest-common- 
denominator politics. If, as Arab extremists 
suggest, Israel is to be turned into "another ' 
Vietnam,” it wdll be refugees who provide the 

Working out a detailed plan will be diffi- 
cult, the more so as such a plan may well 
face Arab attempts to sabotage it by pressure 
on the refugees. But it surely Is not beyond 
human capability. Its provisions wdll presum- 
ably have to include acceptance by Israel of 
a sizeable portion of the refugees as repatri- 
ates (although this requirement could per- 
haps be satisfied by continued occupancy, of 
Israeli territory by the refugees now there) , 
generous compensation for the others, invi- 
tations to many to resettle in the U.S. and 
other countries, and intensive training de- 
signed to make them attractive as human 
resources throughout the Arab world. If the 
plan is generous enough, and reasonable 
enough, it will be extremely difficult for the 
most Intransigent Arab leader to refuse it, 
standing up indefinitely to the combined 
pressure of world opinion, his Own citizens, 
and the refugees themselves. 

In the excitement of Israel’s overwhelming 
military success, it may be easier to per- 
suade the Israelis to tackle the refugee prob- 
lem than to give up the leverage of their ter- 
ritorial gains. But it might be well for the 
U.S. to encourage them to consider with- 
drawal — and without some of the prior con- 
ditions on which they now insist. It is by 
no means obvious that the terms sought by 
Israel will really contribute to the future 
peace of the area and hence to its own ulti- 
mate interests. Such a withdrawal might 
seem a return to the conditions that brought 
on the fighting, and a pointless abandon- 
ment of hard-won fortified defense positions. 
But it could be argued that the Arab fortifi- 
cations on the Syrian heights and the 
massed troops in the Sinai Desert were symp- 
toms, not causes, of the hostility. Arab re- 
sentment of Israel’s presence — the basic 
cause of the fighting — has been intensified 
by Israeli occupation of Arab territory. Some 
diplomats believe that from its present posi- 
tion of strength, Israel could well afford to 
hand back some of the land, undercutting 
Arab charges that it is aggressive and 

U.S. officials argue that it is too early to 
expect the Israelis to mitigate their con- 
ditions. Internal political considerations 
make it difficult for Prime Minister Eshkol to 
do so at the moment. In 1956, American dip- 
lomats point out, even under the combined 
pressure of the U.S. and the Russians, Israeli 
troops remained four months in the Gaza 
Strip and at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba 
before withdrawing. Publicly, however, we 
have given no indication that we wish to see 
the Israelis writhdraw — except on their own 
original terms, which American officials con- 
cede would be dangerous for any Arab leader 
to accept. And if we have been active behind 
the scenes, no effects are visible. 


If by whatever means, the Immediate crisis 
can be damped down and the attention of 
the Arabs directed away from revenge, the 
prospects for eventual development of the 
region are good. The impact of the war has, 

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at least temporarily, revived the goal of uni- 
fied effort and shown Arab leaders how badly 
they need to strengthen themselves. If ever 
a section of the globe cried out for regional 
development, It is the Middle East. Of the oil- 
rich countries, only Iraq has the resources 
to become a balanced agricultural-industrial 
state. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and 
Libya combined have about ten million resi- 
dents, and almost all their land is desert. Yet 
their oil resources generate tremendous 
amounts of capital, most of which cannot 
be constructively employed within their own 
borders. So great are the returns from oil 
that the Middle East, given technics*! assist- 
ance and encouragement, could probably 
finance its own development with almost no 
foreign financial aid. 

Kuwait has^for six years shared some of 
its great oil wealth by way of loans and bank 
deposits totaling nearly $700 million. Some 
expanded version of the Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development, with other oil- 
producing countries Joining in support, is 
probably the most promising vehicle for de- 
velopment. Dr. Talha Yafli, economist and 
general manager of Kuwait Investment Co., 
has worked out in some detail how such an 
inter-Arab fund could be financed and the 
large sums of money that it could provide for 
development. Under his proposal, all oil-pro- 
ducing countries would be obliged to con- 
tribute 5 percent of their oil revenues, to 
be matched by an equal contribution by the 
private foreign companies holding the oil 
concessions. If the organization were started 
this year on that principle, he says, it would 
Immediately have $308 million at its disposal. 
By 1990, he estimates, it would have taken 
in $14 billion. Such amounts dwarf the $3.8 
billion in American economic and military 
aid to the Arab countries over the last 

Consideration is also once more being given 
to the establishment of a Middle Eastern 
Development Sank. From the standpoint of 
the U.S. this would offer an opportunity to 
play a direct role in development of the re- 
gion. Involvement in such a scheme at this 
time might be dlfficuljt to sell Congress, be- 
cause It could commit the U.S. to large-scale 
support of programs devised In considerable 
degree by others. But it would help convince 
the Arabs that we are not determined to 
force an American solution to Middle Eastern 
economic problems. 


Spending all the funds wisely, of course, 
would be anything but automatic. Planners 
and developers can be hired, however, and 
patterns have already been set elsewhere. A 
notable example Is the integrated regional- 
development program being carried out in 

By any standard, the U.S. has a huge stake 
In the tranquility of the Middle East. As a 
high-ranking State Department official puts 
It: “We can’t have another one of these 
wars every few years. It’s too costly and It's 
too damned dangerous.” Among other things, 
this is probably the last war the Arabs and 
Israel can fight without employing fearfully 
destructive and sophisticated weapons. The 
escalation from 1956 is Itself sobering. 

The obstacles that confront the U.S. In 
its efforts to play a constructive role are 
admittedly greater than at any time since 
it moved onto the Middle Eastern stage, and 
it will take time to restore our exhausted 
credit with the Arabs. But the effort must 
be made. Our own safety is too intimately 
involved to write off the Arabs. And If we are 
not to write them off, our policy makers may 
well have to move visibly into a posture of 
more balanced friendship with both sides. 
The war, and our pro-Israeli stance, have 
cut the ground from beneath those Arabs 
who were our advocates. If they are to take 
a public position favorable to us again, 
we must give them something to rally 
around. It Is equally true that the Arabs will 
have to respond positively. Our commit- 
ment to Israel’s existence is not negotiable. 

From our own point of view, the beginning 
of wisdom is to undersand that we are in 
serious trouble In the Arab lands, and that 
we cannot Just wait patiently for them to 
get over their anger. If we make no moves, 
our adversaries could win the game by 


Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I sug- 
gest the absence of a quorum. 

Montoya in the chair) . The clerk will 
call the roll. 

The legislative clerk proceeded to call 
the roll. 

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded. 

objection, it is so ordered. 

Is there further morning business? 


Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, growing 
public pressure for new Government 
services coupled with the inevitable 
bureaucratic tendency to expand has 

needed information by establishing a 
Hoover-type Commission on the Opera- 
tion of the Executive Branch. This blue- 
ribbon panel would be authorized to sur- 
vey the organization and programs of 
the Federal bureaucracy for a 2-year 
period and to report its findings and rec- 
ommendations to the President and the 
Congress. Forty-one of my colleagues 
have since joined in cosponsorship of 
this measure. 

More recently a similar proposal (S. 
2116) was put forth by the distinguished 
junior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. 
Ribicoff] and cosponsored by 20 fellow 
Senators. Thus 63 Senators have ex- 
pressed a desire for such a study. 

This evidence of concern is most heart- 
ening. For if domestic Federal spending 
is truly to be limited a thorough review 
of executive organization and adminis- 
trative procedures is an absolute neces- 
sity. And only a professionally staffed 
review commission with unstinting offi- 
cial support can perform the complex 
examination required. Such a compre- 
hensive and integrated study cannot be 
undertaken directly by the Congress. Its 
workload is too heavy and its responsi- 
bilities too divided. Neither is it likely to 
be undertaken by the bureaucracy itself, 
which has a vested interest in maintain- 
ing the status quo. A special commission 
would best be equipped to provide the 
expertise and devote the continuing at- 
tention necessary to get good results. 

Mr. President, spending cuts to be ef- 
fective must be made selectively. And to 
be made selectively, a great deal of 
knowledge is required. While such de- 
tailed knowledge is not as yet available, 
enough illustrations have come to light 
to give ample cause for concern. For ex- 
ample, in recent years the field of man- 
power development has become a fertile 
one for Federal bureaucrats. Certainly 
some federally sponsored programs are 
needed if the vicious cycle of unemploy- 
ment and poverty Is to be broken. Yet 
these projects have grown with such 
abandon that today 15 different Federal 
departments and agencies find them- 
selves administering 79 different training 
and education programs. In addition, 
nine different programs deal with job re- 
cruitment and at least five subsidize on- 

Iran’s Khuzestan province by the Develop- 
ment & Resources Corp, of New York. Formed 
in 1955 by David Lllienthal and Gordon 
Clapp, two former Tennessee Valley Author- 
ity chairmen, the company has reclaimed 
50,000 acres from the desert and plans even- 
tually to turn an additional 200,000 acres 
Into productive agricultural land. Farm out- 
put In the province has already Increased 
two and a half times as a result of the large- 
scale Irrigation and hydroelectric-dam sys- 
tems. Development & Resources is carrying 
out fourteen other projects around the world, 
and Its officials are more than willing to take 
on part of an Arab development program. 

A dramatic possibility for development is 
the plan devised by Rear Admiral Lewis 
Strauss, former chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, and strongly supported 
by former President Elsenhower. It calls for 
the construction of three huge nuclear-pow- 
ered plants to produce electricity and to con- 
vert seawater Into fresh water. The water 
would then be used to Irrigate thousands of 
Acres of land that is now desert. Strauss es- 
timates the cost of the project at around $1 
billion and has proposed that the U.S. put 
up half of the Initial $200-million capitali- 

pushed Federal spending to enormous 
proportions in recent years. Despite an 
obvious need for a large part of this 
budgetary increase commonsense tells us 
that much of it is wasted. The adminis- 
tration, the Congress, and the American 
people generally agree that the economic 
pressures of the Vietnam war require 
that unessential domestic spending be 
curbed and that wasteful programs be 

If significant improvements are to be 
made, however, this unanimity or pur- 
pose must become swiftly translated into 
action. But unfortunately it seems as 
though Federal spending is becoming 
merely a convenient topic of conversa- 
tion like the weather, with everyone 
talking about it, but no one controlling it. 

Part of the problem here is that de- 
tailed information about the strengths 
and weaknesses of Federal programs that 
is so necessary for making intelligent 
budget savings is simply not available. 

On January 11 of this year I intro- 
duced a bill (S. 47) to develop this much 

the- job training projects. 

Mr. President, illustrations such as 
these, thought provoking as they may be, 
yield no ready answers. They merely 
underscore the need for better coordina- 
tion and less duplication by the Federal 
bureaucracy. If these situations are to 
be effectively prevented in the future, a 
thorough examination of the executive 
branch is required now. For it is only 
through such a comprehensive study that 
genuine long-term improvements can be 
made. It is far better to forestall unpro- 
ductive programs than to prune them 
after they have become entrenched. In 
fact, if such a review had been inaugu- 
rated when this bill was first introduced 
in 1965, perhaps we would not be con- 
templating a 10-percent tax surcharge 
and emergency cuts in Federal spending 

A poet once said, “The chaos is come 
of the organized disorder.” A brief look at 
the multitude of overlapping and ineffi- 
cient Federal programs that have sprung 
forth in the 12 years since the last 

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